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THE "RACE FOR THE TOP" REVISITED:
A COMMENT ON EISENBERG
Ralph K Winter*
I do not intend to offer a critique of any portion of Professor
Eisenberg's paper other than the portion that is itself a critique of my
article' regarding Delaware's role in the development of American cor-
porate law.
His statement of my position is occasionally overdrawn but largely
accurate.2 I do indeed argue that if Delaware fashions laws that allow
side payments out of corporate assets to management to induce it to
incorporate in Delaware, then the earnings per dollar of investment in
Delaware corporations will be lower than earnings per dollar of invest-
ment in corporations governed by laws that do not permit such side
payments. This will in turn put Delaware corporations at a competitive
disadvantage in the capital market, and ultimately the product market,
vis-a-vis corporations whose earnings per dollar of investment are
higher. Professor Eisenberg is also quite correct in stating that my
"claim is driven purely by the argument concerning the cost of capi-
tal." 3 Whether it is therefore also "fatally defective" for the reasons
asserted by him4 in his discussion of the market for capital is another
matter.
Professor Eisenberg advances five arguments in support of his con-
clusion that the capital market does not discipline management. I will
deal with these arguments seriatim.
His first argument is that legal rules allowing side payments do not
create present inefficiencies but only future inefficiencies. Because
legal rules do not affect present cash flow, he argues, an impact on a
corporation's ability to raise capital in the future may be of "little or no
significance to present managers." 5 This I believe to be incorrect.
Even if the side payments will have an effect only in the future, invest-
ment analysts will know (if true) that the earnings of Delaware corpora-
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1. Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6
J. Legal Stud. 251 (1977).
2. A minor point. The Eisenberg Article states that my argument claims that all
states will be induced'to offer optimal charters. Eisenberg, The Structure of Corpora-
tion Law, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1461, 1507 (1989). I believe I limited my argument to
states that seek to maximize franchise taxes.
3. Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 1509.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1500.
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tions are lower in the long run than the earnings of businesses
incorporated elsewhere, and this recognition would have a present ef-
fect on investors. That effect will necessarily be of significance to man-
agers. My argument thus does not critically depend upon whether the
decrease in earnings happens immediately upon incorporation in
Delaware or two years later.
Eisenberg's second argument is that the option of internal financ-
ing tends to release corporations from the discipline of the capital mar-
ket.6 That also seems incorrect. The cost of internal financing is the
opportunity cost or the highest return available from investment
outside the firm. If a corporation can earn 15 percent on an outside
investment, then the cost of investing internally is also 15 percent. Effi-
cient corporations that can borrow at 9 percent and invest retained
earnings at 15 percent are thus far better off than less efficient firms
that must borrow at 16 percent. Conversely, efficient firms that can
earn 20 percent on internal financing are better off than less efficient
firms that can earn less on internal financing than on outside invest-
ment. Internal financing thus does not release management from the
discipline of the capital market.
The third argument Professor Eisenberg makes is that the capital
market will not discipline management if state law rules have "no effect
on profits or cash flow."'7 If by that he means that legal rules that do
not affect earnings or the return on investment will not affect investor
behavior, then of course I agree. My point is only that when a legal rule
does reduce a firm's earnings, this will negatively affect the firm's ability
to raise debt and equity capital.
His fourth argument relies upon the following hypothetical:
[S]uppose that because C Corporation has adopted a poison
ill, C's stock sells for $49 instead of $50. C wants to raise
500,000 in the capital market for equity. The poison pill will
not raise C's out-of-pocket cost of capital: C simply issues
10,204 shares instead of the 10,000 shares it would have is-
sued without the rule.8
This hypothetical appears to be based on the assumption that share
price is independent of the number of shares issued. That assumption
is plainly unsound. If it were correct, C Corporation would issue 39
trillion shares at $49 instead of the 10,204 Eisenberg postulates. If
sound, moreover, competing corporations without a poison pill could
also issue 10,204 (or 39 trillion) shares at $50 a share and still raise
more than C.
Professor Eisenberg's final argument, sprinkled throughout his dis-
cussion, is that the effect of what he calls managerial rules may be so
6. Id. at 1501.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1503 (citation omitted).
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small as to be economically irrelevant.9 If value decreasing rules result-
ing from incorporation in a state like Delaware have only a de minimis
effect, it is hard to see why anyone would care or even describe them as
value decreasing.
My bottom line remains that, if Professor Cary' 0 is right, earnings
per dollar of investment in Delaware corporations must be less than
earnings per dollar of investment in corporations that do not permit
such side payments. Indeed, the entire point of Professor Cary's article
was that investors do worse under Delaware law than under other cor-
porate codes. If he did not mean that, it is difficult to perceive why the
article became so famous. It therefore follows that, unless the market
for capital is indifferent to a firm's earnings, Delaware corporations will
be at a disadvantage in raising capital. This is a consequence that is
hardly likely to maximize Delaware's franchise tax revenues.Il
I want to leave Professor Eisenberg's paper now and to propose
some qualifications to my original position. I am far more confident
that Professor Cary's argument about the race to the bottom is wrong
than I am that my argument that Delaware is leading the race to the top
is right.
First, Professor Eisenberg is entirely correct in pointing out that
state legislatures are political bodies and may be governed by a variety
of motives.' 2 A race to the top argument applies only when a state
legislature is guided solely by a desire to maximize franchise taxes.
Other motives may well prevail, however.
Second, he is correct in asserting that there are cases in which
management may seek legal rules allowing side payments where those
payments outweigh the negative effects of the capital market.' 3 These
cases seem limited to changes in legal rules, including charter amend-
ments or reincorporation in a new state, that occur after investors have
become locked in and that involve, or are accompanied by, measures
that impede takeovers. States that offer such impediments to takeovers
may thus attract some chartering business. Of course, as I stated in my
9. Id. at 1502-05, 1508.
10. See Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 Yale
LJ. 663, 668-70 (1974).
11. In a revision after the conference, Professor Eisenberg responded to this para-
graph with two observations. The first was that all states' corporate codes have reached
the "bottom." See Eisenberg, supra note 2, 1508. This is something of a fantastic claim
in light of the fact that maximizing franchise taxes is not politically important in many
states. Moreover, it is hard to understand how any equity capital can be raised if every
state legal system is rigged against it.
The second observation, that the side payments to management obtainable under a
legal code may outweigh negative effects in the capital market, is to a limited degree
well-taken, and I have added a comment of my own in the text. See infra text accompa-
nying note 13.
12. See Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 1511.
13. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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article, 14 the purpose of impediments to takeovers is precisely to re-
duce the discipline of the capital market and that may well seem attrac-
tive to inefficient managers.
Third, the race to the top may be slow because Delaware is the only
state devoted exclusively to maximizing franchise taxes and may need
only to offer a code marginally more efficient than other states which
may be influenced by law professors, the American Law Institute or
management. It thus may not be difficult for Delaware to compete with
such states for franchise taxes. In fact, the history of state antitakeover
statutes may support the view that the race to the top is a leisurely walk.
In both the first and second generation of takeover statutes, Delaware
waited until its principal competitors had passed such legislation' 5 and
then enacted a relatively mild statute.' 6 It may thus be that what we
need is not a federal chartering statute but rather a second Delaware
that pursues franchise taxes and nothing else.
14. Winter, supra note 1, at 287-89.
15. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 912 (McKinney 1986).
16. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 203 (1983 & Supp. 1989).
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